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CONTRACT LAW AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE
AGE OF WELFARE REFORM
Daniela Caruso*

In this Article, I track the ongoing adaptation of U.S. contract law to the
1990s' contraction of the welfare state. Many courts partake of the prevailing
ideological shift away from socially sensitive adjudication and towards market
mechanisms of private autonomy. In legal scholarship, this phenomenon has
received considerable attention in the past decade. Other courts, however, strive to
compensate for the shortage of welfare services and to pursue redistributive goals.
I provide examples of the latter kind of cases and then analyze the non-linear
relation between doctrines, judicial redistribution, and welfare politics in both case
law and scholarship. Finally, I discuss the role of socially sensitive judicial
discourse in light of contemporary welfare politics and explain its continuing
importance.
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INTRODUCTION

Jay Feinman's "Un-Making Law" and other scholarly contributions
depict a sobering portrait of contemporary common law adjudication.' The picture
is one of a monolithic ideological commitment to roll back, through case law and
statutes, the progressive legal conquests obtained by common law courts through
the 1970s. It is indeed true, in the specific realm of contract law, that cases like

1.
See JAY M. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO
ROLL BACK THE COMMON LAW (2004); Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in
Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (1995) (arguing that the new conceptualism in
contract law reflects political conservatism); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modem
Supreme Court,81 CAL. L. REV. 431, 433-35 (1993); Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort
Law Un-Makers: Recent CaliforniaExperience with "New" Torts, 49 DEPAuL L. REV. 455,
455-56 (1999). Cf Ellis Horvitz, An Analysis of Recent Supreme Court Developments in
Tort and Insurance Law: The Common-Law Tradition, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1145, 1163
(1993) (examining post-1987 California cases and discussing them as samples of the
"evolutionary common law process" rather than symptoms of an overall conservative
trend).
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Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.2 are now considered historical
curiosities, that the duty to read and the dogma of private autonomy control a large
portion of judicial opinions, and that the protection of weaker parties is no longer
fashionable in contract cases. It is also true that this judicial trend is
chronologically in sync with the political triumph of neo-liberalism, and with "the
end of welfare as we [knew] it."'3 This picture, however, remains incomplete.
To begin with, the assumption that the triumph of autonomy in contract
law is an unavoidable byproduct of political neo-conservatism is unwarranted. The
existing variety of welfare systems, as they have developed over time in the
Western world, suggests no necessary correlation between austere welfare politics
and the celebration of contractual autonomy in court.
Another layer of complexity lies in the ambivalent relation between
doctrines that constrain the scope of contractual freedom and the redistributive
potential of contract law. The decline of such doctrines as unconscionability in a
significant number of jurisdictions does not necessarily signal the oblivion of
redistributive goals in the adjudication of private disputes. The doctrinal pillars of
classical contract law are equally amenable to judicial outcomes informed by
sensitivity to context and emerging socio-economic vulnerabilities.
Furthermore, scholars and activists increasingly pursue progressive
agendas through contract strategies in a way that does not rely on socially sensitive
modes of adjudication. In court, by the same token, formalist adjudication may be
turned on its head and produce redistributive results while strictly adhering to the
dogma of autonomy.
While the unmaking-law literature is in many ways analytically accurate,
it underestimates these complexities and brings into a linear function three
independent variables: the direction of welfare politics, the decline of restrictive
contract doctrines, and the fading of progressive agendas in the context of contract
law. I aim to unpack the simplifying assumptions of that literature and to
disentangle the three variables from one another so as to provide a more nuanced
account of contemporary case law and contracts scholarship.

2.
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (refusing to enforce a contract that the court
found to be unconscionable at the time it was made); see also Toker v. Westerman, 274
A.2d 78 (D.N.J. 1970) (finding the retail installment contract for a refrigerator-freezer
unconscionable, even without evidence of procedural unconscionability, because the
contract price of more than $1,200 was more than two-and-one-half times the reasonable
retail value of the unit).
3.
The contraction of welfare benefits had already begun in the early 1970s.
ALVIN L. SCHORR, WELFARE REFORM: FAILURE AND REMEDIES 18 (2001). However, the
"end of welfare as we [knew] it" was explicitly called for by President Clinton. Jason
DeParle, The Clinton Welfare Bill: A Long, Stormy Journey, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1994, at

Al. Clinton eventually signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, replacing the Aid to
Families with Dependant Children (AFDC) program with the Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF) block grant and eliminating the federal entitlement to public
assistance. See SCHORR, supra, at 5, 7.
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By this revised account, the problem is not so much in the actual change
of adjudicatory outcomes, the foreclosure of equitable solutions to contract
disputes, or the impossibility of pursuing regulatory goals by means of contract
law. Courts still enjoy a powerful range of equitable contract doctrines, and
progressive agendas can be adequately served by the most formalist of legal
jargons. The problem, rather, lies in the unmaking of contracts discourse. Overt
redistributive motives in contracts adjudication are used sparingly. Many judicial
opinions depict equitable solutions as a way of reinforcing, rather than correcting,
the logic of self-reliance and autonomy. In scholarly circles, the prevailing view
portrays restrictive contract doctrines as a natural component of contract law rather
than an expression of sensitivity towards social issues.
By contrast, I argue, restrictive judicial rhetoric, even if only in dictum,
retains its importance against the background of welfare reform. Courts perform
not only adjudicatory functions, but also important expressive roles. Judicial
discourse helps to define socially acceptable conventions and informal norms of
interaction. Independent of actual results or distributive outcomes, the occasional
acknowledgment of socially sensitive issues in court contributes to the reassertion
of norms of solidarity and merits note.
This argument proceeds in three steps. Part I provides three illustrations
of contemporary contracts case law. These cases are remarkable because they
contain explicit references to the ongoing contraction of welfare benefits and
overtly adapt contract doctrines to new socio-economic realities. Both a sensitivity
to context and the protection of vulnerable parties are featured prominently in
these opinions, which do not allow the dominant rhetoric of self-reliance to push
those factors aside. Contract law, at least within the identified jurisdictions, has
only been partially unmade.
Part II analyzes relevant developments in recent legal scholarship and
tracks the decline of distributive motives in contemporary contracts discourse. The
view that contract rules, whether restrictive or sternly affirming of private
autonomy, have no direct relation to questions of redistribution has become
increasingly popular. This view now finds wide acceptance and ample support in
judicial opinions. In a post-realist world, the occasional paternalist interference
with private autonomy is considered by many to be an ideologically neutral
element of contract law, no more fit to yield redistributive results than the classical
enforcement of plain agreements.
One strand of contemporary legal scholarship, however, aims at reviving
the importance of restrictive contract doctrines on discursive grounds. This strand
originates in the European debates concerning the harmonization of contract law
and finds fertile soil in U.S. literature on the law's expressive function. Part III
reviews this literature and endorses the idea that the tone of judicial discourse may
still bear on the ultimately political question of redistribution. Acknowledging
social context in the adjudication of private disputes has long-term discursive
salience and-if only for this reason-remains on balance desirable in the age of
welfare reform.
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A few qualifying statements are in order. First, these pages only pertain to
the common law of contracts because of its uniquely complex doctrinal apparatus.
A large part of the unmaking-law literature, that focused on tort litigation and
regulatory reform, remains at the margins of this inquiry. Second, the label
"restrictive contract doctrines" is hereby used to indicate all common law rules that
allow courts both to rectify the parties' apparent a
and to depart from the
canonical endorsement of contractual freedom. Third, these pages adopt the
intentionally broad category of socially sensitive adjudication to indicate overt
judicial concern for the protection of socially weaker parties. 5

Ireements

I. SHRINKING WELFARE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE: THREE
EXAMPLES
The judicial opinions discussed in this Part are characterized by explicit
references to the changed politics of welfare. They illustrate the persistent vitality
of restrictive contract doctrines and of distributive motives in the adjudication of
contract disputes. These opinions pertain to the award of restitution damages
against a contracting agency, to the policing of unconscionable disclaimers, and to
the invalidation of arbitration clauses. What makes each case remarkable is the
courts' overt endorsement of a distributive rationale. Otherwise anodyne doctrines
thereby find use for the purpose of correcting social imbalances resulting from an
overall reduction of welfare benefits. The assumption running through these
examples is that a sensible and nuanced enforcement of contracts is a perfectly apt
instrument for addressing certain undesirable consequences of welfare reform.
A. The Breach of the ContractingState
An increasingly frequent way to improve the efficiency of state welfare

delivery is to contract services out to private providers, who will be obliged to
serve the public according to contract specifications. This is privatization of the
most tenuous kind, whereby the state (or district, county, etc., depending on the
level of localism mandated for each type of service) still takes responsibility, albeit

4.
Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to
Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 285, 293-95 (1995).
5.
This category comprises both distributive and patemalist motives in
adjudication. For analytical distinctions and definitions, see Duncan Kennedy, Distributive
and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory
Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 571-72 (1982). Both
subcategories are viewed with suspicion in discussions about decision-making rules and
coarsely associated with adjudicatory bias. Efficiency motives, by contrast, come across as
mostly neutral guidelines for decision makers. See id at 587-88.
6.
Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 155, 162
(2000) ("The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRA)-which abolished the federal entitlement to financial assistance known as Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, providing instead a system of block grants to the
states-seems to be intensifying the privatization of benefits administration in at least some
states.").
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indirectly, to provide benefits for eligible citizens. Service recipients are usually
not considered third-party beneficiaries,8 and therefore cannot directly enforce the
contractual obligations of either states or private providers. The smooth running of
contractual relations between service providers and the state is in 9 many ways
guaranteed by mechanisms of self-enforcement listed in each contract.
There is still room, however, for disagreement concerning such issues as
the interpretation of contract clauses, the extent of breach, or the availability of
excuses. When such disagreements occur, both sides may invoke the common law
of contracts in court. A close look at such disputes shows that some courts strive to
adapt contract law to the changed circumstances of welfare delivery and use
doctrines in a way that compensates for the shrinking of social benefits.
Sovereign immunity and public policy limit the application of ordinary
common law to the contracting state. For instance, both promissory estoppel and
recovery in quantum meruit are mostly unavailable to private plaintiffs against
municipalities.' 0 In general, equity is supposed to play a lesser role when the state
is the defendant in a contract case. This judicial and statutory policy shelters the
public coffers and confines the state's contractual activities within precise and
predictable guidelines. Against this background, the case of Mrs. Poey appears
quite remarkable.
Linda Poey operated a childcare service in her home in New York City."
The city referred public assistance recipients to her as an approved private daycare provider. The city's Human Resources Administration ("HRA") would
directly compensate authorized providers for serving eligible families. The HRA
issued a reference guide for private providers such as Mrs. Poey, which explained
that the HRA would duly notify her of a participant's benefit termination. Upon
receipt of the notification letter, Mrs. Poey would be expected to immediately stop
providing day care for the newly ineligible families, since she would receive no
7.
See Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by
Commercial Contract, 45 Aiz. L. REV. 83, 85 (2003) (arguing against privatization of

welfare services).
8.
Freeman, supra note 6, at 156 ("Absent a procedural right to participate in
contract negotiations, and without third-party rights of action, the beneficiaries of these
contracts may be left with no avenues for participation or redress.").
9.
See, e.g., Hosanna Homes v. County of Alameda Soc. Servs. Agency, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 326, 331-33 (Ct. App. 2005) (placing foster children with a licensed foster family
agency, which then has the duty to place the children with one of its certified foster
families, receiving compensation for successful, continuous placements).
10.
E.g., 27 N.Y. JUR. 2d Counties, Towns & Municipal Corporations § 1324
(2001). A contract between a municipality or other political subdivision and another party
may be held invalid or unenforceable whenever the power of a municipality to make a
contract is limited, as to the mode or manner of contracting, and "no implied liability arises
against a municipality for benefits received under a contract entered into in violation of
these mandatory provisions." Id. The text further reads: "equitable powers of the courts may
not be invoked to sanction disregard of statutory safeguards and restrictions," and "[iut is
plain that if the restriction put upon municipalities by the legislature for the purposes of
reducing and limiting the incurring of debt and the expenditure of public money may be
removed, there is no legislative remedy for the evils of municipal governments." Id.
11.
Poey v. Eggleston, 777 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Civ. Ct. 2003).
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further payments from HRA. When two of her customers lost eligibility, Mrs.
Poey received no HRA notice, and she continued providing services in expectation
of compensation for many months thereafter.
In the ensuing dispute, the court could have followed the most obvious
precedents by holding that HRA could not contract out childcare services for noneligible beneficiaries and by simply denying recovery to Mrs. Poey in quantum
meruit against the city.12 By taking that course of action, the court would have
aligned itself with an established judicial practice, aimed at discouraging "the
violation of statutes governing the expenditure of public funds" and at
safeguarding "the taxpayers' interest."' 13 But the very same logic of protecting
taxpayers steered the court in the opposite direction. The court looked for less
immediate precedents and eventually granted Ms. Poey full recovery for overdue
tuition. The rationale for the court's choice was explicit:
The child care services provided by Mrs. Poey are
important and in the public interest. State law mandates work fare
programs in order to reduce dependence on public assistance.
Licensed care givers provide a safe environment in which to leave
young children while parents receive important training to become
self-reliant. This is clearly in the interest of the tax payer and a
benefit to society. Conversely, not paying Mrs. Poey for the services
she rendered may result in the reduction and quality of 14
child care
that families of public assistance recipients should receive.
While the Poey v. Eggleston holding rests on a very narrow fact pattern,
its argumentative logic is remarkable. In style, if not in practice, this is "making
law" in the footsteps of a "Grand Tradition" dating back to Britton v. Turner, a
19th century employment case that expanded the reach of quantum meruit to
protect employees' rights to compensation.' 5 The rule against enforcing state
obligations in quantum 6 meruit stops where the reason behind it gives way to
countervailing policies.'
Poey is not an isolated case. When the contracting state is in breach, the
legislative trend of curtailing public expenditures may lead to two alternative
policies in court: a pro-defendant course (as in the unmaking-law scenario), in
17
which the court will excuse the state from all but the clearest obligation to pay,
12.
See, e.g., S. T. Grand, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 330 N.Y.S.2d 594 (App. Div.
1972) (dismissing a claim in quantum meruit against the City, based on an improperly
awarded contract).
13.
Poey, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
14.
Id.
at 231 (emphasis added).
15.
Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834) (finding defendant actually received
plaintiff's labor and thereby derived a benefit and advantage so as to be responsible for
compensating for the labor actually performed).
16.

KARL N. LLEWELLYN,

THE BRAMBLE

BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY

158

(1951) (1930) ("[W]here the reason stops, there stops the rule ....
").
17.
See generally FEINMAN, supra note 1; see also Infant & Nutritional Prods.,
Inc. v. State, No. B177561, 2006 WL 759769, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2006) (rejecting
private vendor's suit for damages against a public agency by declining to create or enforce
any good faith obligation on the State to cater to the private vendor's best interests; a
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and a pro-plaintiff course, if the court believes that the mid-1990s welfare reform
demands strong commitment of states' funds and efforts in order for the reform to
be politically and financially successful. Examples of the latter judicial mode,
identified in Poey, range from preventing the diversion of state funds away from
welfare programs' 8 to rejecting the contractual interpretation of a public entity and
ordering it to compensate a private agency acting in good faith.' 9
The unmaking-law picture, emphasizing the former policy but not the
latter, fails to capture the multi-layered nature of contemporary common law.
B. ChangingNecessities
Gavin W. was two-and-one-half years old when his parents, both with
full-time jobs, enrolled him in a childcare program offered by YMCA of Los
Angeles. The contract contained a release that exculpated YMCA from liability for
injuries caused by its own negligence. Over a year later, another child in the
program molested Gavin in the restroom of the childcare center. The childcare
providers were aware of the child's propensity toward inappropriate sexual
conduct, yet they did not prevent the incident. Gavin's parents sued YMCA for
negligence, but the trial court upheld the release of liability and dismissed both
breach of contract and negligence claims. The court of appeals saw things
differently.20 Justice Perluss began his opinion with long quotes from recent
empirical studies, attesting to the "shortage of quality childcare options for
California families"'', and reporting that "[w]aiting lists for subsidized child care
are especially long, due to insufficient funding."2 2 He concluded that contracts for
childcare services in California are necessarily "affected with a public interest,"
and that YMCA's release of liability was void as against public policy in light of
the Tunkl v. Regents of University of California doctrine regarding exculpatory
provisions. 23
decision against the private vendor was not adverse to the public interest because other
vendors were eager and readily available to provide the service to public benefit recipients).
18.
See Cuyahoga County Bd. of Comm'rs v. State, 832 N.E.2d 745, 750 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2005).
19.
See Corr. Servs. v. Davidson County, No. 02 CVS 739, 2004 WL 2413420,
at *8 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2004).
20.
Gavin W. v. YMCA of Metro. L.A., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 168 (Ct. App. 2003).
21.
Id. at 169 (quoting Linda Jacobsen et al., UnderstandingChild Care Demand
and Supply Issues: New Lessons from Los Angeles, PACE POLICY BRIEF 0 1-2, June 2001, at
1).
22.
Id. at 170 (quoting California Child Care Resource & Referral Network, The
California Child Care Portfolio, 2001: A Compilation of Data about Child Care in
California,County by County 1 (2001)).

23.
Id. (citing Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal.
1963), in which the Supreme Court of California invalidated an exculpatory provision
releasing a medical center from liability in part because the center's services were of
practical necessity to the public); cf Randas v. YMCA of Metro. L.A., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 245,
247 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding release that swimmer signed did not involve the public
interest). Feinman cites Randas as a sign that "disclaimers will be allowed in more
circumstances, as fewer activities are considered to have a public interest .... " FEINMAN,
supra note 1, at 99.
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Boilerplate waivers, disclaimers, and releases are commonly found in
contract forms drafted by providers of recreational services. They are also
commonly enforced by courts, based on a three-part rationale: (1) recreational
activities, while not necessary, are socially desirable options; (2) the availability of
such services would certainly shrink if providers were forced to internalize all
costs of their employees' negligence; and (3) those who find ordinary disclaimers
objectionable may choose to do without optional recreation.24
Any change in welfare regimes, addressing a wide range of social
commodities, from housing and employment benefits to education and healthcare,
is bound to affect the balance between social needs and market options. In
particular, a reduction in subsidized services may increase the public's reliance on
the availability of such services through private contracts. On the basis of this
assumption, contract adjudication takes two different courses. Certain courts
become particularly sensitive to the need of keeping the market alive and routinely
uphold disclaimers so as to reduce the operating costs of private providers.25 The
appellate court decision in Gavin W.'s case is indicative of the opposite approach:
when welfare shrinks, what used to be an option becomes a necessity and must
legally be treated as such. If parents really have no choice other than relying on the
private market for childcare services, it is essential that common law courts police
blanket disclaimers and keep childcare standards from spiraling downward.
C. Unconscionability, Again: Employment Contracts and Arbitration
In the mid-1990s, Katherine Stone contributed to the unmaking-law
literature with an article focused on employment contracts.26 She offered the
following portrait:
In recent years ... a new trend has emerged that threatens
to turn back the clock on workers' rights. This trend is found in
legal doctrines andjudicial opinions that require workers to assert
their statutory rights in the forum of private arbitration ...
[E]mployers are using arbitration clauses as a new-found weapon to
escape burdensome employment regulations. 7

24.
Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 745 (Mass. 2002).
25.
See, e.g., Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649 (Ct.
App. 1990) ("The public as a whole receives the benefits of such waivers .... [The options
for recreational and sports activities] are steadily decreasing-victims of decreasing
financial and tax support for other than the bare essentials of an education.").
26.
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1017

(1996).
27.
Id at 1019 (emphasis added). As an example of such clauses, consider the
contractual practice of Circuit City Stores, requesting that the following claims, among
others, be submitted to arbitration:
claims arising under ... Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ...
state discrimination statutes, state statutes and/or common law regulating
employment termination, the law of contract or the law of tort; including,
but not limited to, claims for malicious prosecution, wrongful discharge,
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Stone's contribution came on the heels of two relevant U.S. Supreme
Court cases. First, in Southland v. Keating, the Court established that the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA") preempts state law when it purports to invalidate
arbitration agreements in contracts involving commerce. 5 Second, in Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., the Court held that statutory claims may be the
subject of arbitration agreements and that the exclusionary clause in section 1 of
the FAA is inapplicable to arbitration clauses contained in securities applications.2 9
Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court further restricted the
possibility of challenging arbitral clauses in two notable opinions: Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, which narrowly read section 1 of the FAA's exclusionary
clause to except only the contracts of employment for classes of workers engaged
in transportation, 30 and Green Tree FinancialCorp.-Alabama v. Randolph, which
compelled arbitration despite the possibility that the litigant might face prohibitive
costs in enforcing her statutory rights. 31 At the dawn of the new millennium,
enforcement
of arbitration clauses in employment contracts seems to be as strong
32
as ever.
Yet, employment contracts remain substantially subject to state common
law. 33 Thus, it remains the case that "generally applicable contract defenses may
be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements. 34 In a recent string of cases, state
wrongful arrest/wrongful imprisonment, and intentional/negligent
infliction of emotional distress or defamation.
Brief of Appellant Circuit City Stores, Inc. at 10, Al-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 394
F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-35297).
28.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984).

29.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991). Section 1
of the FAA states: "[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce." Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
30.
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
31.
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-91 (2000) ("It may
well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant such as
Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum....
[But the] 'risk' that Randolph will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to
justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.").
32.
See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed
Term, Standard Form Employment Agreements, 49 ARiz. L. REv. 637, 638-39 (2007)
(noting that arbitration clauses and non-compete covenants, both routinely placed in
standardized employment contracts, combine to shrink the package of employees'
entitlements).
33.
See Michael Schneidereit, A Cold Night: Unconscionabilityas a Defense to
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Agreements, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 996
(2004) (outlining the history of arbitration in U.S. law since 1925 and concluding that "the
last vestige of a defense to mandatory arbitration of employment contracts ... lies instate
contract law").
34.
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (holding that
contract defenses grounded in state law, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may
operate to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening Section 2 of the FAA).
This important holding goes hand in hand with another opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court,
holding that the arbitration agreement signed by an employee did not prevent him from
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contract doctrines have allowed employee-plaintiffs to avoid employer-drafted
arbitration clauses and to bring their claims in court. What comes most
conveniently to the aid of employees is the worn out, lame, and otherwise
forgotten doctrine of unconscionability. 35 A typical component of this doctrine
rests in the absence of meaningful choice for one of the parties to a contract. 36 In
principle, employees are bound by arbitration clauses contained in standard jobapplication or employment forms. 37 But how meaningful is their choice? 38 Once
more, the shrinking of the welfare state and the non-deferability of employment
inform judicial findings and determine litigation outcomes:
[I]n the case of preemployment arbitration contracts, the economic
pressure exerted by employers on all but the most sought-after
filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which in turn
retained full choice of forum and of relief against the employer. EEOC v. Waffle House,
Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297-98 (2002).

35.

Feinman concedes that in extreme cases "[t]here continues to be much

litigation about the unconscionability of particular arbitration schemes, and courts do strike
down some as too one-sided." FEINMAN, supra note 1, at 107.
See Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
36.
1965); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 95 (N.J. 1960). By contrast, if
consumers could have purchased from other vendors under different contract terms, or if
they could simply have chosen not to buy at all, courts tend to dismiss all claims of
unconscionability. See, e.g., Brown v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, 267 F. Supp. 2d 61, 73-75

(D.D.C. 2003) (rejecting the employee's unconscionability arguments and ordering the
employee to submit her claims to arbitration where plaintiff employee was a Harvard
educated attorney who had a meaningful choice in the execution of her employment

contract and the terms were not unreasonably favorable to the other party); Wayne v.
Staples, Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 556 (Ct. App. 2006) ("There can be no 'oppression'
establishing procedural unconscionability, even assuming unequal bargaining power and an
adhesion contract, when the customer has meaningful choices .... ).
Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2005). In
37.
Caley, the court stated:
We recognize that the Ninth Circuit in Ingle v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160,
124 S. Ct. 1169, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1204 (2003), found such a clause
unconscionable. However, the Ninth Circuit was applying a California-

law rebuttable presumption of unconscionability in employer-employee
arbitration agreements. Georgia courts, unlike California courts,
typically enforce contracts between parties of unequal bargaining
positions, including in the employment context, and apply no such

presumption.
Id. at 1378 n.21.
Stone remarked that "[a]t the moment of hire, employees lack bargaining
38.
power and are needful of employment, so they frequently agree to such terms without
giving them much thought," but she described courts as almost uniformly indifferent to this
point. Stone, supra note 26, at 1036, 1038. The one exception to this judicial indifference
resided in opinions of the Ninth Circuit, holding that employees' statutory civil rights could
not be waived without a "knowing agreement." E.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42
F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Congress intended there to be at least a knowing
agreement to arbitrate employment disputes before an employee may be deemed to have
waived the comprehensive statutory rights, remedies and procedural protections prescribed
in Title VII and related state statutes."); see also Amow-Richman, supra note 32, at 663-64.
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employees may be particularly acute, for the arbitration agreement
stands between the employee and necessary employment, and few
employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration
requirement.39
Courts confidently invalidate certain arbitration clauses on grounds of
unconscionability under the state contract laws of California, 40 Montana, 4 1 and
Washington.42 Outside of the Ninth Circuit, even courts most favorable to the
enforcement of arbitration agreements have hinted at the possibility of voiding
them in cases of grave contractual imbalance.43 While enforcing arbitration
clauses, some courts often concede that different facts-involving less choice and
44
more risks for the employees-might lead to a finding of unconscionability.
Others curb the most oppressive features of otherwise enforceable arbitration
clauses.45
The courts' reasoning, unsurprisingly, pivots on the dearth of the
employee's choice.46 Because employment is even less deferrable today than it

39.
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal.
2000) (emphasis added).
40.
See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir.
2003); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893-94 (9th Cir. 2002). Cf Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding Ahmed's contract
was not adhesive because it was not a condition of employment and there was a choice to
opt-out); Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 694; Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract:
Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment
Law, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 399 (2006).
41.
Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 941 (9th Cir. 2001)
(applying Montana law).
42.
A1-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 394 F.3d 1254, 1262 (9th Cir. 2005)
(applying Washington law).
43.
E.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 615 (D.S.C. 1998)
(denying motion to compel arbitration where there was "a marked disparity in the parties'
bargaining power" and the "arbitration scheme fails miserably to satisfy even the most basic
requirements of a commercially reasonable arbitration scheme"), aff'd, 173 F.3d 933 (4th
Cir. 1999).
44.
See, e.g., Musnick v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255, 1259 (1 lth Cir. 2003);
Lyster v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 239 F.3d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 2001) (recognizing
"the potential that substantial arbitration fees may make an arbitration agreement
unconscionable"); W.K. v. Farrell, 853 N.E.2d 728, 737 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
45.
Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 681 (8th Cir. 2001)
(finding the inclusion of a damages-limitation clause did not affect the validity of the entire
arbitration agreement, severing the invalid provision, and enforcing the remaining
agreement).
46.
See generally Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir.
2002); Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (10th Cir. 2001) (franchise
agreement context); Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., 253 F.3d 1280 (11 th Cir. 2001),
vacated, 294 F.3d 1275 (11 th Cir. 2002); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th
Cir. 1999); Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 771, 779 (D. Tenn. 2002), rev'd and
vacated, 367 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2004).
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once was, employees are often found to lack meaningful choice when signing on to
the terms unilaterally drafted by prospective employers.47
Within the Ninth Circuit, the tendency to invalidate arbitration clauses on
grounds of unconscionability is most pronounced.48 At the opposite end of the
spectrum, the Seventh Circuit tends to uphold employment contracts as written,
arbitration clauses and all, because "[o]ne aspect of personal liberty is the [job
applicant's] entitlement to exchange statutory rights for something valued more
highly"-employment.4 9
Interestingly, choice and individual freedom are the justifications offered
by each end of the spectrum when taking their respective paths of adjudication.
D. Unmaking Law, Revisited
The cases analyzed in the foregoing pages provide an essential
complement to the unmaking-law landscape. Descriptively, these cases suggest
that the legislative reforms of the 1990s have not eradicated distributive motives
from contracts case law. Even when federal statutes embrace conservative
ideologies, state courts retain meaningful room for maneuver and handle cases in
ways that are not ideologically predetermined. 50 The opinion of the Poey court, for
instance, forces the contracting state to internalize the costs of notification failures,
both in the Poey dispute and in future cases in the same jurisdiction. It is therefore
meant to be as distributive as the decision to create an administrative system for
the monitoring of welfare agencies, with a consequent increase in public spending.
The holding relates to an unusual fact pattern, and is therefore of limited practical
significance, but it is still strongly characterized by the goal of softening,
judicially, the hard edges of the reformed welfare regime. In this respect, the
"conservative campaign to roll back the common law" has not entirely
succeeded.5
These cases also make the general point that there is no necessary
correlation between trends in welfare politics and trends in contract law. The
relative generosity of welfare benefits, the incidence of restrictive doctrines, and
the pursuit of redistribution by way of contracts adjudication, may develop
synergies and proceed in sync, 52 but they may as well be orthogonal to one
another.53

47.
Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in PreDispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 90
CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1234-35 (2002).
See Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003),
48.

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004).
49.
Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 294
F.3d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Perdue v. RBC Mortgage Co., 156 Fed. App. 824
(7th Cir. 2005).
50.
See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.

51.
52.

FEINMAN, supra note 1.

The lengthy opinion drafted by Judge Francis in Henningsen v. Bloomfield

Motors, Inc. presents a telling sample of judicial paternalism inspired by legislative trends.
161 A.2d 69, 85 (N.J. 1960).
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Comparative legal history provides pertinent points of reference. At the
dawn of the 20th century, continental Europe displayed a net increase in social
legislation on one hand, and a staunch adherence to autonomy in contract law on
the other.54 Progressive politics and formalist judicial entrenchment can be
compatible bedfellows. By the same token, a legislative move towards welfare
austerity may generate compensatory judicial doctrines and enhance the role of
paternalism in the adjudication of private disputes. Again, Europe offers
convenient models of this phenomenon. Until recently, Sweden was characterized
by generous welfare benefits andby a dominance of distributive concerns in court.
Because of global economic pressure and EU-mandated constraints, the country is
now experiencing a significant shrinking of state-provided benefits, an ongoing
transformation prompting Swedish courts to cling to equitable discretion, and to
resist the legislative turn to self-reliance.55 As illustrated above, the landscape of
contemporary case law can and does host similar judicial phenomena. The revival
of unconscionability and the expansion of the Tunkl doctrine in state courts
constitute conscious and perfectly plausible compensatory techniques.

The Legislature has intervened in the public interest, not only to regulate
the manner of operation on the highway but also to require periodic
inspection of motor vehicles and to impose a duty on manufacturers to
adopt certain safety devices and methods in their construction. It is
apparent that the public has an interest not only in the safe manufacture
of automobiles, but also, as shown by the Sales Act, in protecting the
rights and remedies of purchasers, so far as it can be accomplished
consistently with our system of free enterprise.
Id. (citation omitted).
53.
See Robert A. Hillman, The "New Conservatism" in Contract Law and the
Process of Legal Change, 40 B.C. L. REV. 879, 880-81 (1999) (questioning the assumption
that the 1990s' neo-conceptualism in contract law has really favored economically
privileged parties).
54.
See William E. Forbath, Politics, State Building, and the Courts, 1870-1920,
in 2 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW 1N AMERICA 1092, 1093, 1158 (Michael Grossberg &
Christopher Tomlins eds., forthcoming December 2007) (explaining that in the early 20th
century, European nations created broad systems of public social insurance, administered by
a strong, centralized bureaucracy. As a consequence, European courts did not need to take
upon themselves the U.S. courts' task of "striking the balance between the old liberalism
and the new."); FRANz WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE 431-33 (Tony
Wier ed. & trans., 1995) (noting that in pre-World War I Germany, labor law and other
aspects of social regulation had to be excised and separated from the system of private law
in order to maintain its internal coherence).
Analogous reactions to regulatory intervention can be found in the U.S. judiciary. See,
e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 390-91 (Conn. 1980) (Cotter, J.
dissenting) (defending the doctrine of employment at will in all areas but the ones expressly
contemplated by legislation).
See Rasmus Goksor, Jurisprudence on Protection of Weaker Parties in
55.
European Contracts Law from a Swedish and Nordic Perspective, 6 CHI-KENT J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 184, 249-50 (2006), available at http://www.kentlaw.edu/jicl/articles/spring2006/

GOKSOR.pdf.
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E. The Ambivalence of Judicial Policies and Doctrines in the Age of Welfare
Reform
The case-law examples provided above also make an important analytical
point. Even when courts seem to embrace what Feinman describes as a dominant,
pervasive ideology 56 (celebrating autonomy over solidarity), varied judicial results
are possible. As observed, the very rationale of switching from social assistance to
market-based services may lead judges to constrain contractual autonomy and
expand the role of the Tunkl doctrine. 7 The goal of saving taxpayers' money may
prompt courts to find in favor of plaintiffs when the defendant state fails to
compensate private providers of social services. 58 The nonpaternalist belief that
everyone must get a job and outgrow welfare dependence may induce judges to
59
exempt employees with little bargaining power from unconscionable obligations.
In this revised picture, the public policy of welfare austerity can be turned on its
head in court and yield opposite distributive effects.
By the same token, restrictive contract doctrines are not the only vehicles
for counteracting the current trend in welfare politics. While a finding of
unconscionability (in employment contexts) and the paternalist deletion of waivers
(as in Gavin W. v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles) have a distinct antimarket
flavor, the Poey opinion does without restrictive doctrines and only pursues the
realization of the parties' agreed exchange. Yet, it is no less meaningful an
example of socially sensitive adjudication. Redistributive agendas can be equally
served by restrictive doctrines and by classical contract law.
Welfare politics, doctrinal arguments, and distributive outcomes are by no
means aligned in this picture. An analogous degree of complexity is to be found in
the legal scholarship on restrictive doctrines and judicial redistribution.

II. THE FALL OF DISTRIBUTIVE MOTIVES
Against the background of changing welfare politics, this Part reviews a
progression of scholarly articles on the subject of distributive motives in contract
law. The traditional dismissal of judicial redistribution, based on grounds of
institutional competence and economic efficiency, underwent passionate
challenges in the 1970s and 1980s, when several scholars defended the legitimacy
of distributive motives in adjudication. 60 That scholarly discourse is still alive but
no longer occupies the center-stage of academic debates. 61 Today, neoformalist
scholars push distributive and paternalist motives to the margins of contract law. In
broader academic circles, however, restrictive contract doctrines are understood as
FEINMAN, supra note 1, at 3 (describing "a comprehensive and coordinated
56.
campaign to reshape the common law" involving "[p]oliticians, academics, and
ideologues").
See Gavin W. v. YMCA of Metro. L.A., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 168, 175-76 (Ct.
57.
App. 2003).

58.
59.
(Cal. 2000).
60.
61.

See Poey v. Eggleston, 777 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Civ. Ct. 2003).
See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690
See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.B.
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neutral vehicles for the balancing of conflicting policies and therefore disjoined
from redistributive agendas. While logically flowing from basic insights of legal
realism, this prevailing view underestimates the osmotic relation between judicial
discourse and social reform.
A. Restrictive ContractDoctrinesfrom the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s
The common law of contracts rests on the premise that agreements should
be enforced in accordance with the manifested intentions of the parties, but it also
allows for the policing of bargains through a variety of techniques. Some
doctrines, such as fraud and mistake, can be easily rationalized as necessary
corollaries of private autonomy, as they aim at protecting
individual will from
62
obfuscating circumstances and at avoiding market failures.
Other policing doctrines, such as avoidance of contract terms based on
"progressive" public policy, are harder to reconcile with the idea of freedom of
contract. They are, in fact, meant to protect weaker parties from their own
improvidence and can be used to correct the systemic bargaining inequality of
whole categories of contracting parties.63 These doctrines became judicially
prominent in the 1960s and 1970s-a time in which the dominant political
forces
64
had expressly embraced the goal of combating poverty and discrimination.
This judicial trend met with foreseeable scholarly resistance. All
limitations on freedom of contract, resulting either from compulsory terms or from
the paternalist policing of whole classes of agreements, met objection not only on
doctrinal grounds but also as vehicles of back-door redistribution, and therefore at
odds with autonomy and economic logic. 65 Critics posited that those who attempt
to favor socially weaker parties, either by releasing them from agreed-upon duties
or by enhancing their contractual entitlements, end up hurting the very same

62.

RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW

104 (3d ed. 1986) (arguing

that fraud, incapacity, and duress, if narrowly defined, can be proper grounds for
repudiating contractual obligations); see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113

YALE

L.J. 541, 619 (2003) (arguing that

welfare maximization justifies courts in refusing enforcement of contracts affected by fraud
or duress).
63.
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 249 (1993)
("[A]ny serviceable concept of autonomy probably requires some sensitivity to concerns
about exploitation of situational inequalities. But what distinguishes these cases from other
forms of inequalities is precisely that they are situational and not systemic. Systemic
inequalities... are not well suited to judicial redress in two-party contract disputes .... ").
64.
In his 1964 State of the Union address, President Lyndon Johnson
announced: "This administration today, here and now, declares unconditional war on
poverty in America." Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. President, Annual Message to the Congress
on the State of the Union (Jan. 8, 1964). Feinman defines the 1960s and 1970s as times of
liberal developments, "culminat[ing] in a wave of consumer oriented legislation and judicial
decisions." FEINMAN, supra note 1, at 81.
65.

See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability:A CriticalReappraisal,18

J.L. & ECON. 293, 293-95, 315 (1975) (defending freedom of contract on utilitarian
grounds).
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people they are trying to help.66 The additional costs imposed upon business by
interference with private autonomy would eventually be passed along and worsen,
rather than improve, the conditions of employees, customers, tenants, franchisees,
etc.
The ideological climate of the 1970s, however, prompted a surge of
scholarly interest in the redistributive potential of private adjudication. Several
authors became intensely preoccupied with redeeming the idea of distributive
motives in private law from its traditional law and economics critiques. They
argued that there is no clear economic reason for expunging distributive or
paternalist motives from contracts adjudication. In their view, the pass-along
critique proved either over-inclusive or altogether wrong in light of a proper
assessment of context.67 While mostly concerned with compulsory terms, this line
of scholarly arguments also supported the idea that policing contracts through
restrictive contract doctrines would be both politically desirable and economically
sensible.68
B. The 1990s' Downturn of Restrictive ContractDoctrines

With the 1980s' increase in regulatory intervention for the sake of weaker
market actors, the pursuit of redistribution through adjudication of private disputes
became, by comparison, a less desirable option. By the late 1980s, the "puniness
problem" of redistributive adjudication had been persuasively articulated. 69 Even
when judicial activism enhanced the socio-economic status of weaker social
groups, its impact seemed quantitatively insignificant. The regulatory option of
compulsory contract terms seemed, by contrast, promising and wide open. Those
interested in redressing social inequalities switched their attention to regulatory
domains. 70 This was, per se, one of the reasons restrictive contract doctrines lost
their progressive appeal. But more was at stake.
In the 1990s, the pass-along critique gained political visibility in
conservative quarters and renewed popularity in legal discourse. From the

66.

See RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 259-62 (1st ed.

1972) (arguing that the result of strict housing code enforcement is likely to be a reduction
in the stock of housing available to the poor).
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and Redistribution
67.
Policy: A Reply to ProfessorKomesar, 82 YALE L.J. 1194, 1194 (1973); Bruce Ackerman,
Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing
Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1188 (1971); Richard S.
Markovits, The Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirabilityof Ideal
Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1815, 1815, 1817

(1976).
68.

See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 5; Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalismand the

Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 770 (1983) (arguing that contractual regulation will on
occasion be the least intrusive and most efficient way of redistributing wealth).
Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness:Empathy and Economic Analysis at the
69.
Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REV. 349, 384, 405 (1988).
See generally Jean Braucher, The FailedPromise of the UCITA Mass-Market
70.
Concept and its Lessonsfor Policing of StandardForm Contracts, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 393 (2003) (illustrating the attention switch to regulatory domains).
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standpoint of the Seventh Circuit, judges still believing in the possibility of judicial
redistribution were simply delusional. In the words of Richard Posner:
The idea that favoring one side or the other in a class of
contract disputes can redistribute wealth is one of the most
persistent illusions of judicial power. It comes from failing to
consider the full consequences of legal decisions. Courts deciding
contract cases cannot durably shift the balance of advantages to the
weaker side of the market; they can only make contracts more costly
to that side in the future, because [the stronger side] will demand
compensation for bearing onerous terms. 7
This argument was regularly paired with the idea that redistribution is a
matter of regulatory and fiscal policy and should not be achieved with the coarse
and incoherent tool of adjudication.72 Redistribution, with clear losses and benefits
for identifiable social groups, came to be deemed beyond the73 scope of courts'
intervention and properly left to other institutional mechanisms.
C. The Law & Economics Diatribe
To be sure, the front of law and economics scholars was not as united as it
might seem. In the mid 1990s, Eric Posner revisited the relation between the
common law of contracts and the welfare state on economic grounds. 74 Posner's
contribution starts from the assumption that the government is committed to
combating poverty and that a certain degree of welfare intervention must be taken
for granted as a feature of contemporary capitalism. 75 He also presupposes that
welfare provides the poor with a sense of ultimate security. As a consequence,
actual or potential benefit recipients are prone to engage in risky practices, such as
high-interest borrowings or relatively unaffordable purchases.76 By definition,
high-risk ventures are more likely to end up badly. The poor become poorer, and
more of the taxpayers' money is needed to bail them OUt. 77 In this light, Posner
71.
Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies,
Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 282 (7th Cir. 1992).
72.

See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient

than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 677 (1994)
(concluding that "[r]edistribution is accomplished more efficiently through the income tax
system than through the use of legal rules").
73.
See FEINMAN, supra note 1, at 2-3 (arguing that "[r]ecent decades represent a
conservative response to liberal developments in the 1960s and 1970s").
74.
Posner, supra note 4, at 285. Law and Economics scholars interested in
wealth redistribution through common law have more recently tackled tort law, rather than
the common law of contracts. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, BehavioralEconomics Analysis of

Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1653, 1657-58 (1998) (providing a law and
economics defense of redistribution through legal rules, and explaining that the analysis of
redistributive legal rules in contract law poses different issues).
75.
Posner, supra note 4, at 285 (outlining a "minimum welfare theory").
76.
Id. at 286 (positing that "[b]ecause loss of income or other assets entitles an
individual to payment from the state, . . . actors make riskier investments and more often
suffer failure than they would outside a welfare regime").
77.
Id. (arguing that "welfare opportunism is foremost a threat to the state's fisc:
it increases the number of people to whom the state must pay benefits").
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determines that restrictive contract doctrines, such as unconscionability, perform
the useful function of preventing the poor from taking too many chances, which in
turn keeps welfare expenditures from escalating. 8
Adding a dynamic spin to Eric Posner's model, one obtains the following
formula: the more generous the welfare state, the higher the need to correct the
indigents' spending frenzy with such devices as the unconscionability doctrine and
usury laws. By contrast, should the welfare state get leaner, and should the poor be
warned that the financial consequences of their reckless behavior shall fall on them
and their families, courts might return to a classical understanding of private
autonomy and enforce all contracts as written. Within this analytical framework,
the cases discussed in Part I represent a sort of historical in-between-not as
frequent as at the high point of welfare as we knew it, but still appropriate insofar
as taxpayers continue to subsidize the reckless poor.
This positive spin on restrictive contract doctrines did not directly engage
with the above-mentioned critiques (pass-along, quantitative irrelevance, lack of
institutional competence, and incoherence) and garnered little attention in legal
academia. By contrast, the pass-along question-investigating whether
compulsory contract terms would necessarily hurt consumers--continued to be the
subject of academic discussions in the 1990s, 79 and to this day it cannot be
considered settled.80 The scholarly debate, however, now centers on the different
question of the role of formalism in contract law.
D. Neoformalism8' and the Restructuringof ProgressiveAgendas
The comeback of formalism in contract law, both in court and in legal
scholarship, is a large-scale phenomenon and properly identified as such by Jay
Feinman.82 The triumph of individual will, as expressed through consent within the
78.
Id. at 296-97 (arguing that restrictive contract doctrines deter the offering of
high-risk credit to the poor).
79.
See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency
and Distributionin Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REv. 361, 361-62 (1991).
80.
See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223,

229 (2000) (challenging on economic grounds the assumption that the employers' costs of
an accommodation mandate will typically be shifted to the accommodated group in the form
of reduced wages or reduced employment levels).
81.
For a concise distinction between legal formalism and neoformalism, see
Robert E. Scott, The Casefor Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847,
851 n. 11 (2000) (describing neoformalists as relying upon instrumental justifications rather
than on pure logical arguments).
82.
FEINMAN, supra note 1, at 127 (discussing the conservative drive towards
"enforcing the apparent deals the parties make, not looking beyond the four comers of a
document that embodies an agreement, and not judging the fairness or reasonableness of a
transaction"); see also Roy Kreitner, Fear of Contract, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 429, 444
(observing that formalists "hope to see contract cleansed of any considerations beyond
corrective justice [or] efficiency"). For prominent instances of neoformalism in contract
law, see CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
(1981) (putting forth a general theory of promissory obligations); Randy E. Barnett, A
Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 270-71 (1986) (providing a unitary
account of contract law based on consent theory); Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration,and
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four comers of a written agreement, is now hailed even in settings once understood
as steeped in social context. 83 This literature abounds with caveats against the
perils of judicial interference with private autonomy. 84 Legal intervention must be
non-intrusive,85 choice of forum is presumptively legal,86 and "restrictive"
doctrines are to be used with utter parsimony.8 7 It is against this background that
the unmaking-law literature laments the disappearance of restrictive doctrines and
the ensuing indifference to social causes in both contracts scholarship and case
law.
Neoformalism, however, is not per se antithetical to progressive agendas.
If restrictive contract doctrines are truly at odds with the dominant rhetoric of selfreliance, it may make sense for several scholars to pursue social agendas on other
grounds, and perhaps turn neo-classical private autonomy to the systemic
advantage of weaker contracting parties. 8
Within the widespread "return to contract" movement, one finds several
projects explicitly animated by redistributive goals. Even though contract law has
been purged of social elements and reduced to the simple schema of an exchange
between formally equal parties, private agreements can be cleverly utilized:

the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 1 (1991) (The author
argues "against the prevailing academic conception that sees a mistaken or frustrated

contract as an occasion for judicial intervention in the form of 'gap-filling."').
83.
See Scott, supra note 81, at 851-52.
84.
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 62, at 619.
The welfare-maximization goal... cannot support many of the
mandatory rules that today govern much contracting behavior between
firms. These rules bar enforcement to contract terms that efficiently cope
with problems of hidden information and hidden action. A normative
theory of contract law that takes party sovereignty seriously shows that
much of the expansion of contract law over the last fifty years has been
ill-advised.... Taking freedom of contract seriously... would radically
truncate current contract law. A law merchant appropriate to our time
would be a merchants' law; and for merchants, the less publicly supplied
law the better.
Id.
85.
See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an
Imperfect World: What to Do When PartiesHave Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted
Incomplete Contracts, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 323, 328-29 (explaining that legal interventioni.e., judicial filling of gaps in incomplete contracts-is only called for "when the sunk
costs-uncertainty about the likelihood of and the presence of opportunistic behavior-are
present and the parties' costs of reducing opportunism on their own are more costly than a
judicial alternative").
86.
See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
87.
See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J.
369, 371 (2004) (advocating a return to a "parsimonious contract law").
88.
See Nancy Ehrenreich, The ProgressivePotential in Privatization,73 DENV.
U. L. REv. 1235, 1237 (1996) (suggesting that "the move to the private may not necessarily
be ... a conservative political move" and that "progressives [may] discover a subversive
potential in private solutions").
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a) to remedy the under-appreciation of women's labor in the
family;89
b) to provide unmarried cohabitants with economic security;90
c) to correct the systemic exploitation of socially marginalized
groups in the market for body parts; 9'
d) to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in
the work place.92
In all of these projects, the judicial revision of consent, motivated by
unequal bargaining power or other social concerns, is unnecessary and perhaps
undesirable. Scholars proceed creatively with contractual instruments without the
baggage of restrictive doctrines, which might sound obsolete and detract from the
contemporary appeal of their projects.
The celebration of consent carries through in public law contexts. The
metaphor of choice was once property: famously introduced by Charles Reich, 93 it
prompted a reconceptualization of welfare entitlements, whereby administrative
whim would be replaced by individual rights and due process safeguards.94 Today,
the metaphor of choice in public law is contract. 95 The idea of bargained-for
exchange effectively captures the growing role of negotiation and consent in the
relation between public agencies and private actors. 96 Here again, contractual
89.
Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposalfor Valuing
Women's Work through PremaritalSecurity Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17, 18-20 (1998).
Cf Katharine B. Silbaugh, MarriageContracts andthe Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. REV.
65, 67-70 (1998) (arguing for the non-enforcement of premarital agreements).
90.
Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private
Distinction,36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 79-81 (2001).
91.
MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY & DEMAND OF BODY
PARTS 21-22 (2006) (recommending "a transparent but limited market approach" which
"would allow for individuals to negotiate for organ transfer upon death"); see also Michele
Goodwin, Private Ordering and Social Justice: Reconceptualizing The Right to Contract,
49 ARIZ. L. REV. 599, 625 (2007).
92.
See Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Privatizing Employment
Protections,49 ARIz. L. REV. 587, 587 (2007). The "contract" devised by Ayres and Brown
is a license, granting employers the right to use a specially created Fair Employment Mark
based on proposed ENDA legislation. By explicitly identifying employees as third-party
beneficiaries, the license agreement allows employees to sue employers on grounds of
discrimination not yet contemplated by statute. Id see also IAN AYRES & JENNIFER
GERARDA BROWN, STRAIGHTFORWARD: HOW TO MOBILIZE HETEROSEXUAL SUPPORT FOR

GAY RIGHTS (2005).

93.
Charles Reich, The New Property,73 YALE LJ. 733, 786-87 (1964).
94.
William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD.
L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1985).
95.
See Christine N. Cimini, The New Contract: Welfare Reform, Devolution,
and Due Process, 61 MD. L. REv. 246, 250 (2002) (explaining that in the current paradigm
of public assistance, "government agents . . . assess each applicant and create an
individualized contract or plan detailing the agreement between the government and the
recipient").
96.
See Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and
Diminished Democracy in Local Government Contractsfor Welfare-to- Work Services, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559, 1563 (2001) (explaining that in order to comply with the
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consent is understood as the crude result of unbridled bargaining. Yet, exactly in
such situations contract can serve progressive causes, such as curing the
97
inefficiency of environmental regulation,
or improving the quality of educational
98
disabilities.
with
services for children
E. The Richness Viewpoint
Quite distant from the unmaking-law standpoint, another line of
scholarship perceives contract law to be "rich" in doctrinal tools and underlying
policies. 99 This scholarship turns the potentially desolate landscape of legal
formalism into a fertile and bountiful place. Here, contractual autonomy,
provocatively declared dead by Grant Gilmore in the 1970s, 100 is alive and well,
but so is a large countervailing set of doctrinal arguments, which may still correct
at the margins the one-sided harshness of private agreements. Today, many
perceive the whole body of contract doctrines as a vehicle for balancing a set of
conflicting but equally legitimate policies.10 1 Freedom of contract coexists with
judicial intervention motivated by considerations ranging "from fairness, equality
and morality to efficiency.' ' 10 2 Courts are meant to balance countervailing
considerations in a way that produces socially acceptable outcomes, but no
obvious redistributive results. 0 3 Far from imagining any direct connection
between doctrinal restrictions of autonomy and progressive reforms, this wellestablished and comprehensive viewpoint finds justification for socially sensitive
adjudication within the boundaries of legal doctrine or in the philosophical
underpinnings of private exchange. 1°4 In a clever summa of contemporary legal
scholarship, Robert Hillman finds in contract law a perfect compendium of
multifarious world views. In purposefully general and conciliatory terms, Hillman
asserts that "contract law largely succeeds because it is the product of the legal
system's reasonable and practical compromises over conflicting values and

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, "many states are privatizing
by contracting out services that have long been the province of government").
97.
Freeman, supra note 6, at 192-94.
98.
See Daniela Caruso, Bargaining and Distribution in Special Education, 14
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 171, 194-95 (2005).

99.

TREBILCOCK,

supra note 63, at 243 (advocating "a rich conception of

individual autonomy," entailing both a positive and a negative theory of liberty, and making
room for contract doctrines meant to redress "the deliberate exploitation by one party of
another party's lack of choices").
100.
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).

101.

Efficiency-understood as enhancement of social welfare-and judicial

economy-understood as minimal use of the expensive and cumbersome machinery of
justice-are examples of such nonideological goals on which everyone is bound to agree.
102.
ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW 267 (1997).
103.
Kreitner, supra note 82, at 442-46 (offering a comprehensive genealogy of
the idea of conflicting considerations in contracts adjudication).
104.
The philosophical sources recently invoked in support of paternalist contracts
adjudication range from Aristotle to Rawls. See James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83
CAL. L. REv. 547, 548-550 (1995); Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and
Contract Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 598 (2005).
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interests."1' 0 5 Only by letting a million doctrinal flowers bloom may
contract
06
adjudication achieve an "appropriate mix of flexibility and certainty."',
This broad perspective accommodates a wide variety of scholarly
viewpoints. 0 7 It is compatible with a neoliberal understanding of private
autonomy, whereby equitable adjustments of classical contract law, flexible
standards, unconscionability, and other policing doctrines are simply welcome
correctives to the dogma of contractual freedom.' 08 But it also flows logically from
classical legal-realist contributions, showing how multiple and very diverse
policies can underlie doctrinal arguments.' 0 9 Even the question of redistribution
through contract adjudication-once a polarizing issue among contracts
scholars" 0 -becomes relatively non-divisive if disjoined from ideology and
phrased in very general terms."'
From this eclectic viewpoint, restrictive doctrines are just as legitimate in
contemporary contract enforcement as the fostering of private autonomy. Judges
interfere with contractual freedom not because of a complete misunderstanding of
the judiciary's competences or because of specific political biases, but rather in the
dutiful performance of their institutional role. They remain non-ideological
enforcers of private bargains and simply take into consideration, as courts are
supposed to do when interpreting and enforcing contracts, the social context and
the transformations it is undergoing.
This view provides a necessary counterpoint to the unmaking-law
perspective, which overestimates the synergy of conservative ideology and
neoformalism. It fails, however, to capture the osmotic relation between judicial
rhetoric and social change, which is, as we shall see, discursive if not purposive.1 2
105.
HILLMAN, supra note 102, at 2.
106.
Id. at 171.
107.
The idea that common law adjudication is based on balancing conflicting
considerations is by now widely accepted in legal academia. See Duncan Kennedy, From
the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and
Form," 100 COLUM. L. REv. 94, 96 (2000) (noting that "[there is a] nearly universal elite

legal academic view that we could indeed resolve all situations where there is choice of
norm by balancing conflicting considerations of one kind or another").
108.
109.

supra note 63, at 243.
Kreitner, supra note 82, 442-44 ("Legal realism ... derives its impetus from
TREBILCOCK,

the insight that, in actuality, lawmaking is full of conflicting considerations that are not
susceptible of definitive ordering."). For an example of such insights, see Stewart
Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law of Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REv. 812, 816 (1961).
110.

See, e.g., E.

ALLAN FARNSWORTH,

CONTRACTS

217-18 (4th ed. 2004)

(Judicial "interference in the bargaining process requires courts to consider competing
policies" such as autonomy and transactional stability on one hand, and prevention of
unfairness on the other, but also that courts are "not well equipped to redress fundamental
imbalances in the distribution of wealth.").
111.
See, e.g., HILLMAN, supra note 102, at 273 ("[C]ontract law contributes to
distributive justice through its... policing standards.").
112.
See Hillman, supra note 53, at 885-86. Hillman acknowledges the reflective
function of adjudication and assumes that judicial decisions preferring the enforcement of
written contracts over asserted oral, less formal agreements are a reflection of increased
conservatism (i.e. trust in markets rather than in government) in public opinion. These pages
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F. Unmaking Discourse
In light of the foregoing pages, the unmaking-law literature retains much
relevance but requires adjustments. First, the transformation of the common law is
much less radical than in the unmaking-law scenario. As illustrated in Part I, social
and political events can give new impetus to dormant doctrines, and the
foreclosure of possibilities at the level of federal courts leaves ample margin for
socially sensitive adjudication in state courts. Second, according to a large set of
contemporary scholarship, restrictive contract doctrines coexist comfortably with
the dogma of autonomy. Neoformalism occupies only part of the contracts-theory
stage. Third, even if restrictive doctrines were to become irrelevant exceptions in
judicial discourse, it would still be quite possible to implement progressive
agendas by means of contract law. The "return to contract" movement has shown a
great deal of potential in this respect.
The real and profound transformation that has occurred over the years is
the detachment of progressive agendas from the use of restrictive arguments both
in courts and in legal scholarship. As observed above, in a post-Realist scenario,
contract law is often perceived as ambivalent in point of results. There no longer
seems to be anything socially sensitive or politically compelling about any given
doctrinal path. Even when courts openly attempt to correct the social imbalances
generated by the contraction of welfare, they use paternalist language as sparingly
as possible and make sure to cloak1 redistributive
motives in the guise of autonomy,
3
self-reliance, or lean government.'
The question acutely raised by the unmaking-law scholars,' 1 4 but left
unanswered, is not whether the conservative campaign has succeeded at
demolishing the progressive potential of contract law; rather, the question is
whether the change in contracts discourse-the demise of paternalist language and
the formalist suppression of distributive motives-is a reason for concern. The
cases identified in Part I, whereby restrictive doctrines are explicitly put to the
service of redistributive goals and meant as correctives to welfare contraction, lend
themselves to different readings. They could simply attest to contract law's ability
to embrace social change, thanks to its rich doctrinal toolset. In this light, they
would seem plain and unremarkable. Alternatively, they could be read as instances
of unwarranted nostalgia because, as observed, courts could have yielded identical
outcomes without resorting to overt-and pass6-redistributive language. It is also
possible, however, to read those cases as important attempts to engage at
discursive levels with the merits of welfare reform.

Il. THE RELEVANCE OF CONTRACT DISCOURSE
Even if the connection between restrictive contract doctrines and
progressive politics is no longer necessary or direct, the relationship between
socially sensitive adjudication and the politics of welfare reform equates to
focus on the expressive function of private adjudication, and see courts as plausible agents
of change in public discourse. Id.
113.
This argumentative style is most evident in Poey v. Eggleston, 777 N.Y.S.2d
227 (Civ. Ct. 2003).
114.
See supra note 1.
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something more than pure indeterminacy. The cases exemplified in Part I may
inform legal discourse in ways that have long-term political salience. Their impact
is mixed and yet, I conclude, desirable on balance.
A. The Danger of Normalization
The nostalgic attachment to restrictive contract doctrines, which pervades
the unmaking-law literature, is occasionally the target of harsh political critiques.
David Dante Troutt, for instance, highlights the absurdity of tackling poverty by
policing contracts, when the poor have little experience with the kind of legal,
1 15
enforceable contracts that most scholars and judges envisage in their writings.
This viewpoint leads to a complete disengagement with contract law as a
possibility for pursuing social justice of any kind.
Another strand of contemporary legal scholarship asserts that the only
role of social nuances in common law is to provide an aesthetically pleasing
counterbalance to pure market rhetoric. The eternal balancing of conflicting
considerations, omnipresent in the adjudication of disputes, simply marks "a
commitment to a safe and ironically invariant middle of the road."'116 If this is the
case, paternalism is no correction to the dogma of individual autonomy. Rather, it
allows for individualism to be softened at the margins and thus avoid challenge.
Unconscionability and similar judicial niceties
cosmetically enhance the status quo
17
and therefore prevent political mobilization.'
In this scenario, the endless play of conflicting considerations in contracts
adjudication allows distributive motives to resurface constantly and counterbalance
the rhetoric of individual freedom or private autonomy. Thanks to such
compensatory mechanisms, the legal universe may display features of internal
peace, coherence, and legitimacy. Analogies abound. A generous and charitable
treatment of war prisoners, desirable as it is, may cast even the most atrocious acts
of military aggression in a somewhat favorable light.11 8 The political temperature
stays lukewarm, or increases ever so slightly each day, so that no one can really
feel the heat. For similar reasons, the normalization critique results in a sobering
message: those who praise the courts' sensitivity to the downsides of welfare
contraction should realize they are falling into the trap of convenient cosmetics.

115.

David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Revisited: Antimarkets, Consumption, and

Empowerment, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (2000) (Regulatory and adjudicatory
"protections assume the primacy of meaningful consumer choice, which itself assumes
choice. They assume that 'market failures' can be corrected through minor, equitable
adjustments in contract performance litigated by individual consumers against private
vendors. They do not, therefore, assume the harsh economic realities of the inner-city poor."
(footnotes omitted)).
116.
Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1047,
1080 (2002).
117.

DUNCAN KENNEDY,A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION {FIN DE SItCLE} 2 (1997)

(arguing that the dominance of judicial lawmaking reduces the power of political activism).
118.

DAVID KENNEDY,THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIANISM 25 (2004) (arguing that the vocabulary of human rights may provide
useful justifications for those whose political and military projects are repressive).
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There is, however, another way to look at the same picture, one just as
concerned with the decline of welfare. Both in Europe and in the United States, the
importance of keeping alive the practice of injecting considerations of social
justice in judicial discourse finds new sources of scholarly support.
B. The Revival of Paternalistand Distributive Motives in European Contracts
Discourse
A number of European scholars look at paternalist contract doctrines with
particular interest today. The ongoing harmonization of contract law in the
European Union is increasingly acquiring constitutional salience. The project of
organizing the technical contract rules of the twenty-seven member states around a
set of coherent and uniform principles finds merit in the functionalist goals of
abolishing market barriers, equalizing the level of consumer protection throughout
the Union, and leveling the playing field for business actors.' 19 At the same time,
however, the harmonization of contract law prompts new reflections on which
balance between free market
and regulation is appropriate and acceptable for all
20
European constituencies. 1
Discussions on this topic are politically difficult. The process of
dismantling the traditional welfare state and replacing it with a pan-EuropeanUnion market for welfare services is "much discussed [and] politically
controversial."' 2' As is well known, there is tremendous resistance in Europe
towards the idea of codifying a set of identical political and social goals for the
entire Union. The fact that the project of establishing a constitution for Europe
came to a halt in 2005 can be at least in part blamed on the difficulty of agreeing
on a finite list of common values. 22 Member States have not yet pooled their

119.
Christian Joerges, The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of
Private Law: A Pleafor a New Legal Discipline, 14 DUKE J.COMP. & INT'L L. 149, 157
(2004) (noticing that the European Commission, when promoting the harmonization of
contract law, appeals "to the functional necessities of market building and the need to
prevent distortions of competition caused by legal differences among Member States").
120.
See Martijn W. Hesselink, Principles of European Contract Law: Some
Choices Made by the Lando Commission, in MARTIJN W. HESSELINK, THE NEw EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW 75, 107-11 (2002) (discussing the difficulty of striking a balance between
competing social and doctrinal views in the context of contract law harmonization).
121.
Gareth Davies, The Process and Side-Effects of Harmonisationof European
Welfare States, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 02/06 (2006), available at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/06/060201 .pdf. Davies explains that this process
has in many ways already occurred, based on the European Court of Justice's interpretation
of market freedoms and competition law. Id.
122.
Highly indicative in this respect is the debate on whether or not to mention
Christianity, or religion in general, in the preamble of the draft Constitution. See Robert
Howse, Piety and the Preamble, LEGAL AFF., May-June 2004, at 60, 60 (reviewing JOSEPH
H.H. WEILER, UN'EUROPA CRISTIANA: UN SAGGIO ESPLORATIVO (BUR Saggi, Milano,
2003)). Also relevant is the not yet binding and, in any case, overly vague language of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/1). See Griinne de
B6rca, The Drafting of a Constitution for the European Union: Europe's Madisonian
Moment or a Moment of Madness?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 555, 573-74 (2004). Grdinne
de Birca explains that:
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sovereignty in matters of welfare benefits and social security, and no unification of
legal regimes is in sight in such matters. 123 By contrast, the process of contract law
harmonization is very much underway. 124 In this context-seemingly remote from
politics and confined to the functional goal of establishing a seamless market-the
task of discussing an acceptable societal vision for the twenty-seven member states.
slowly reaches accomplishment. New E.U.-wide rules for the adjudication of
contract disputes may have some degree of distributive relevance.125 But even
when neutral in distributive terms, such rules help set the stage for, and the tone of,
the public debate on the future of the E.U. 126
The subject of contract law harmonization has polarized legal
academia. 27 On one side of the debate, scholars insist on keeping the rules of
market exchange anchored to the realization of private autonomy.' 28 This view is
intuitively in line with the original free-market rationale that started the process of
European integration in the 1950s. On the opposite side, others argue that contractlaw rules and standards have more than technical meaning and reflect the norms of
solidarity prevailing in each member state. They demand, therefore, that
considerations of fairness and wealth redistribution be at the forefront of contract
law. 129 Others dismiss as simplistic the link between rigid contract rules and
political neoliberalism and point to creative uses of contractual mechanisms for

Many of the rights contained in [the Charter] are expressed in vague and
weak terms. Several of the rights relate to areas in which the EU has few
or no powers of action. Some have deemed many of the "principles"
contained in the Charter to be nonjusticiable, and the general clauses at
the end of the Charter are preoccupied with asserting and ensuring that it
brings about no change whatsoever in the relations between the EU and
the states ....
Id

123.
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 325) 65 (2002), art. 137(l) (allowing the European
Community to "support and complement," but not to harmonize, the modernization of
social protection systems in the Member States).
124.
See Commission Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis
(Presentedby the European Commission), COM (2006) 744 final, (Feb. 8, 2007), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons-int/safeshop/acquis/green-paper-cons-acquis-en.pdf
(listing relevant harmonizing legislation in matters of contract law).

125.

Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, Social Justice in

European Contract Law: A Manifesto, 10 EUR. L.J. 653, 665 (2004) ("A modem statement

of the principles of the private law of contracts needs to recognize its increasingly pivotal
role in establishing distributive fairness in society.").
126.
See generally Duncan Kennedy, The PoliticalStakes in "Merely Technical"
Issues of Contract Law, 10 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 7 (2007).
127.
Hugh Collins, Editorial: The Future of European Private Law: An
Introduction, 10 EUR. L.J. 649, 649 (2004); Ugo Mattei & Femanda Nicola, A "Social
Dimension" in EuropeanPrivate Law? The Callfor Setting a ProgressiveAgenda, 41 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2006).
128.
See, e.g., Jiirgen Basedow, A Common Contract Law for the Common
Market, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1169, 1173-82 (1996).

129.
at 665.

See Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, supra note 125,
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purposes of social justice.130 In the context of European integration, contracts
discourse has now become a place where otherwise intractable questions, such as
the desirability of Europe-wide social cohesion, take manageable proportions and
lend themselves to regional cooperation.' 3 1 In this discourse, the injection of
paternalist and distributive motives performs a meaningful expressive function.
C. Norms and the Expressive Function of Socially Sensitive Adjudication
A renewed appreciation of paternalist arguments and overt distributive
motives in common-law adjudication may find indirect support in the camp of
social norms theory.
The literature on social norms explores the general constraints placed
upon human behavior by social conventions, custom, and fear of reputation costs,
rather than sanctions and enforceable rules. 132 Scholars preoccupied with the
relation between norms and proper legal rules have articulated the idea that law
and norms engage in a sort of bilateral, fluid exchange.' 33 Legal rules are enacted
against the background of preexisting norms of34 conduct. Norms, in turn, are
affected by the values enforceable law embodies.'
In this analysis, "law" may refer not only to statutes but also to judicial
opinions.1 35 Norms scholars now provide a sophisticated account of why courts,
though being countermajoritarian in principle, may nonetheless reflect prevailing
moral attitudes and even influence social behavior.' 36 By this account, when courts
130.
Mattei & Nicola, supra note 127, at 62-65.
131.
See generally, Daniela Caruso, Private Law and Public Stakes in European
Integration:The Case of Property, 10 EUR. L.J. 751 (2004).
132.
The groundbreaking empirical work on this subject is ROBERT ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETrLE DISPUTES (1991). For an update on relevant

literature, see Richard McAdams & Eric B. Rasmusen, Norms in Law and Economics, in
THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds.,
forthcoming Jul. 2007), availableat www.rasmusen.org/papers/norms.pdf.
133.
JOHN N. DROBAK, Introduction, in NORMS AND THE LAW 1, 1 (John N.
Drobak ed., 2006) ("[l]nformal rules, like norms, religious precepts and codes of conduct,
and formal rules, like statutes and the common law... work in parallel to influence society.
Norms and law also have an impact on each other." (citation omitted)).
134.
Id.(noting that "the law can be a strong influence on a change in norms,
by... inducing a change in the perceptions about the propriety of certain conduct").
135.
Most of the work on legal expression focuses on legal rules of general
application stated in advance of a particular dispute. More recently, however, scholars have
begun to focus on the expressive effect of adjudication, i.e., the power of courts and
tribunals to influence both disputants and broader audiences "after [a] dispute occurs."
Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 1043,
1062; see also Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive
Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1039, 1041 (1999) (finding that "[a]n expressive function
may, in fact, be the most significant one that courts perform"); Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 2028 (1996) (discussing the
educative and cultural role of adjudication).
136.
Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L.
REv. 339, 374-78 (2000); McAdams, supra note 135, at 1092 (explaining that courts
"merely by expression, can influence behavior"). The question of the propriety of counter-
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adjudicate disputes and offer guidelines of relational conduct, they may simply
embrace preaccrued values and conventions, 137 but they may also signal a change
138
in what morality and fairness require, thus redirecting prevailing perceptions.
This is all the more true when the judicial reference to norms is quite irrelevant to
the outcome of a given dispute, and simply happens to reinforce in dictum the
results of traditional doctrinal arguments.' 39
When applied in the context of ongoing welfare politics, the theory of
judicial expression helps to explain the cases discussed in Part I. As observed,
referring to the new vulnerabilities generated by the "end of welfare" is not a
necessary argumentative step for courts inclined to invalidate disclaimers, 1to40
compel cities to pay for day care services, or to strike down arbitration clauses.
By addressing the need to tailor contracts adjudication to changed social
circumstances, however, courts perform at the same time a reflective and
expressive function. On one hand, they reflect the persistent livelihood of altruism
in a prevailingly individualist society; on the other, by incorporating social
cohesiveness into final judicial statements, they enhance the currency of
distributive arguments in public debates as well as in private interactions.141
From this viewpoint, the livelihood of socially sensitive discourse in court
is definitely desirable. While incapable of yielding progressive redistribution in the
majoritarian law-making in common law courts exceeds the scope of this Article. It may
suffice here to accept the general proposition that "in a real sense no decision is formalist or
mechanical, even when the judge thinks it is," that judges operate within a "framework of
norms and values and ideas floating about in society," and that "judges can be arranged...
so as to form a nice, ordinary bell-shaped curve" depending on which norms, values, and
ideas they espouse. Lawrence M. Friedman, Judging the Judges: Some Remarks on the Way
Judges Think and the Way Judges Act, in NoRMs AND THE LAW 139, 153 (John N. Drobak

ed., 2006).
See Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and Institutions:
137.
Constructing the European Community's Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY:
BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 173, 204 (J. Goldstein & Robert 0.
Keohane eds., 1993) (arguing that the European Court of Justice often decides disputes on

some constrained, predictable basis, and retroactively expresses "what occurred in the
past"); Hillman, supra note 53, at 885 (arguing that judges are unlikely to resist "sustained,

generalized changes in perspectives and values").
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McAdams, supra note 135, at 1069 ("By changing the individuals' view of

the facts, signals might change the individual's view of what morality or fairness requires,
and thereby change behavior.").
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This point is effectively elaborated by Jonathan C. Lipson, The Expressive
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(applying the theory of judicial expression to recent Delaware cases concerning fiduciary
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perhaps, from norms to standards and rules").
See supra at Parts I.D-E.
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Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An
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influence the behavior of the players by signaling her belief.").

694

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 49:665

short term, paternalist and distributive arguments are still a meaningful way of
expressing, through judicial opinions, the sort of concerns that should animate
political debate. 142 Just as in the E.U., where the harmonization of contract law is
an occasion for defining common constitutional values, the adjudication of
contract disputes in the U.S. contributes to defining the tone of legal debate.
Judicial opinions of the kind exemplified in Part I carry meaningful discursive
weight, if nothing else.
D. ConcludingRemarks
This Article provides a revised version of the unmaking-law literature.
The conservative bent in contracts adjudication and the rise of neoformalism in
academic circles are indeed remarkable phenomena, but not necessarily in the
terms espoused by the unmaking-law scholars. As a matter of fact, the adjudication
of contract disputes is not flatly aligned with the celebration of self-reliance in
political circles. Equitable doctrines, even if cast as mere enablers of individual
autonomy, continue to perform traditional corrective functions on a case-by-case
basis. Moreover, due to the plasticity of its meaning, the very concept of private
autonomy can generate judicial arguments apt to make up for bargaining
inequities. Contractual autonomy is also at the core of several progressive
strategies, whereby neoliberal market mechanisms are used to redress social
problems. At the level of scholarship, a neo-formalist faith in private autonomy is
certainly on the rise, but it is still far from occupying the center stage of legal
discourse. Much more common is the understanding of contract law as a place
where conflicting considerations, mostly neutral in distributive terms, can be
balanced and reconciled.
The problem does not lie in the judicial abandonment of restrictive
contract doctrines, in the rise of neoformalism, or in the dearth of progressive uses
of contractual mechanisms. Rather, the problem lies in the paucity of judicial
opinions that engage directly with market failures generated by the political
decline of solidarity. This change in contracts discourse may have no impact on the
net yield of redistributive outcomes, but it does endorse, expressively, the triumph
of individualism in political milieus. By contrast, the laudable, if infrequent,
contract cases exemplified at the start of these pages are overt responses to
ongoing welfare reforms and provide much needed counterbalance to the rhetoric
of self-reliance.

142.
See Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory
Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1335 (1998) (arguing that courts adjudicating contracts
disputes "must consider the effect of their decisions on all the rest of us" rather than simply
on litigants).

